



























Impact of board gender composition on corporate debt  
maturity structures* 
                                                                                                                                          
Yiwei Li1† , Xiu-Ye Zhang2 
1Essex Business School 




2 College of Business and Economics 
 






       
JEL Classification: G30; G32; J16 
Key Word: Women director; Gender diversity; Debt maturity 
 
* We thank John Doukas (the Editor), two anonymous referees and participants at the 41st EAA 
Annual Congress for very insightful comments  and  helpful  suggestions. All errors are our own. 






This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not been through 
the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to differences 
between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as doi:[10.1111/eufm.12214]  
 



























Impact of board gender composition on corporate debt  
maturity structures 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of female directors on corporate debt maturity structures. We find that 
firms with a higher ratio of female directors tend to have a larger proportion of short-maturity debt. This 
effect is more pronounced with female independent directors and is insignificant with female inside 
directors. These findings remain robust under propensity score matching and instrumental variable 
approaches to address potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we find that our results are driven 
primarily by firms with weak governance quality and low financial constraints. We also find that the 
effect does not differ between high- and low-leveraged firms, and there is a negative relation between 
female directors and likelihood of overinvestment. This evidence suggests that female directors view 
short-term debt as a monitoring device. 
1. Introduction 
Gender diversity in corporate boardrooms was originally advocated as a matter of justice and human 
rights. However, whether it also gives rise to a range of positive economic outcomes remains unclear. 
There is a growing literature investigating the effects of gender-diverse boards since Norway first 
initiated mandatory requirements for gender diversity on boards, which has subsequently been adopted 
by many other countries. Insofar as this issue has been examined directly, the vast majority of studies 
focus on the ultimate effects on firm value or financial performance (see, e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Carter, Simkins, and Simpson, 2003; Farrell and Hersch, 2005). However, 
since female directors may have different attitudes toward governance and bring a different kind of 
deliberation in discussions than their male counterparts, they could have particular influences on 
corporate policies in the process of decision making. 
An emerging body of research investigates the monitoring role of female directors in such corporate 
decisions as dividend payout policy (see, e.g. Chen, Leung, & Goergen, 2017), executive compensation 
(see, e.g. Carter, Franco, & Gine, 2017), and mergers and acquisitions (see, e.g. Levi, Li, & Zhang, 
2014). However, one type of important corporate policy, debt maturity structure, has remained largely 
unexplored. 
Corporate debt maturity structure is not only one of the key elements of corporate financial policy, it is 
also believed to be an important corporate governance device. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) 
argue that shorter-term debt can reduce managerial incentives to increase risk. Jensen (1986) notes the 
monitoring role of short-term debt in alleviating overinvestment behaviour. Short-term debt also has 
been shown to alleviate the agency costs stemming from managerial discretion by subjecting managers 


























is important to understand whether female directors influence corporate capital structure decisions by 
choosing a particular debt maturity structure and utilizing it as a monitoring device. 
We aim to test the effect of gender diversity on corporate debt maturity by examining whether there are 
systematic differences in the choice of debt maturity in the presence of female directors. We argue that 
female directors place more emphasis on monitoring, and thus are more likely to use short-term debt as 
a governance mechanism to monitor managers’ actions. First, empirical evidence suggests that female 
directors focus more on monitoring than male directors. Gender diversity in the boardroom thus has 
significant implications for board dynamics. The presence of female directors on boards brings not only 
different perspectives, skills, and knowledge, but also different values and norms (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 
2011; Miller & Triana, 2009). Moreover, gender-diverse boards are associated with more in-depth board 
deliberations and less conformity of attitudes (Adams, Gary, & Nowland, 2011; Clarke, 2005; Huse and 
Grethe Solberg, 2006; McInerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria, & Salipante, 2008). Gender diversity on boards 
thus encourages more competitive interaction in the boardroom as well as more effective board 
communication. In addition, recent studies indicate that female directors provide greater oversight and 
monitoring of managers’ behaviour and actions. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) observe that 
female directors are more likely to undertake increased monitoring, attend more board meetings, and 
demand greater accountability for poor performance from managers. 
Second, short-term debt can motivate managers to align their interests with shareholder interests more 
effectively by reducing the cash flow available to be spent at the discretion of managers. Short-term 
debt therefore serves as an effective monitoring instrument by avoiding the potential for inefficient 
investment by managers, consequently controlling managerial overinvestment behaviour. The threat 
caused by failure to make short-term debt payments also enhances manager incentives to improve the 
efficiency of fund utilization (Hart & Moore, 1994). 
Given the characteristics of monitoring by female directors and of short-term debt, it is possible that 
female directors are more likely to use short-term debt to monitor managers than are male directors. We 
expect this effect to be weaker when overinvestment is less likely, i.e. when other corporate governance 
mechanisms are strong and managers are subject to financial constraints. 
However, there are competing views that oppose this argument, and the influence of female directors 
on corporate governance is controversial. Corporations may use gender diversity only to convey the 
appearance that they are complying with social norms and expectations of how firms should behave, 
while in reality female directors might be marginalized and play no significant role in governance. If 
this were the case, we would not find an association between gender diversity and debt maturity. 
Moreover, some studies document unfavourable outcomes with regard to board gender diversity. For 
instance, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that mandatory female board representation causes a significant 


























the case, we would not be able to find systematic evidence of an association between gender diversity 
and debt maturity in situations where governance is critical. 
We examine whether there is a positive relationship between female directors and short-term debt by 
using a sample taken from the S&P 1500 for the period 1997–2016. We show that firms with a greater 
proportion of female directors are more likely to adopt a shorter debt maturity structure than firms with 
a lower proportion of female directors. Our results are more pronounced when only independent female 
directors are examined. Our findings remain robust after implementing the propensity score matching 
(PSM) and instrumental variable (IV) approaches to control for firm and debt characteristics and other 
potential endogeneity issues. 
Further, we find that our full sample results are driven by firms with weak governance quality and 
higher governance needs, as proxied by the managerial entrenchment index (E-index) (Bebchuk, Cohen, 
& Ferrell, 2009) and analyst coverage. This finding is consistent with our main argument that, compared 
with male directors, female directors are more likely to adopt shorter debt maturity structure as a 
monitoring and governance mechanism in firms with weak corporate governance quality and higher 
corporate governance needs. We also find that the positive relationship between female directors and 
short-term debt disappears for firms with financial constraints, since the overinvestment associated with 
a free cash flow agency problem decreases due to the decline in internal cash flow and financial 
constraints under such circumstances. We also address concerns over the confounding effects from 
debtholder monitoring by comparing different debtholders’ power through classifying firms into high-
leveraged and low-leveraged groups. Our results show that the association between female directors 
and debt maturity structure does not vary across high- and low-leveraged firms. More directly, we 
further present evidence that female directors reduce the likelihood of overinvestment. We also exclude 
the alternative explanation that women in general are more risk averse, and thereby more likely to 
choose less risky short-term debt, by comparing the effects from independent and inside female 
directors. 
Taken together, our findings are consistent with our argument that female directors are more likely to 
use short-term debt as a corporate governance device, reducing the potential for managerial 
opportunism and self-serving overinvestment. 
We make at least three contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study to investigate the corporate debt maturity consequences of having female directors on boards. 
Prior literature shows conflicting findings regarding the role that female directors play; we generate 
evidence that the presence of female directors is positively related to use of short-term debt. These 
findings concur with research that finds female directors play a significant role in a series of important 
corporate decisions (see, e.g. Carter, Franco, & Gine, 2017; Chen, Leung and Goergen, 2017; Levi, Li 


























Second, we contribute to a growing body of literature exploring various determinants of corporate debt 
maturity structure (e.g. Barclay & Smith, 1995; Billett, King, & Mauer, 2007; Brockman, Martin, & 
Unlu, 2010; Dang & Phan, 2016; Guedes & Opler, 1996; Johnson, 2003). We generate evidence that 
including female directors on boards is one factor that shapes corporate debt maturity policies. 
Third, this study contributes to the literature that links gender diversity on boards to monitoring intensity 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Chen, Leung, & Goergen, 2017; Gul, Srinidhi and Ng, 2011). We note that 
female directors undertake more monitoring than their male counterparts, as reflected by use of short-
term debt as a monitoring device in firms with weak corporate governance quality and higher corporate 
governance needs. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and develops our main 
hypotheses. In Section 3, we present data sources, sample selection, variable definitions, and summary 
statistics. Section 4 discusses our main regression results. Section 5 presents the sensitivity tests of our 
main results. Additional analysis is provided in Section 6. Finally, we set forth our conclusions in 
Section 7. 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
Role of female directors 
Over the past two decades, there has been both a voluntary and a mandatory increase in the proportion 
of women on corporate boards worldwide. However, since this is largely a result of the emergence of 
inclusion and gender equality to create a more balanced society, there has been a great deal of 
debate over whether boards with more female directors can be justified as a means toward better 
economic performance. Driven by such a direct motive for understanding female directors’ role, many 
studies focus on the impact on firm value or financial performance. However, findings are mixed. For 
example Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) find significant positive relationships between the 
proportion of female directors and firm value. In contrast, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that mandated 
female board representation leads to a deterioration in operating performance, since it results in younger 
and less experienced boards. Based on performance analysis but taking a more complex business 
environment into consideration, Farrell and Hersch (2005) suggest that gender diversity tends not to be 
a value-enhancing strategy, but rather a response to the demand for either internal or external calls for 
diversity. Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that female directors have a significant impact on firm 
outcomes, but the average effect of gender diversity on firm performance is negative, and this negative 
effect is driven by companies with fewer takeover defences, suggesting that mandating gender quotas 
for directors can reduce firm value for well-governed firms. Post and Byron (2015) conduct a meta-
analysis and conclude that board diversity is neither wholly detrimental nor wholly beneficial to firm 
financial performance. These authors suggest that board diversity may be leveraged to improve firm 


























findings indicate that focusing purely on firm performance or value enhancement in investigating 
female directors’ role may limit understanding of the impact of gender diversity on boards. 
Recent research investigates the role of female directors through a broader scope, considering such 
factors as corporate strategy and a variety of corporate decisions. From the perspective of directors’ 
monitoring role, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that gender-diverse boards are associated with better 
attendance records and that CEO turnover is more sensitive to stock performance in such firms. Nielsen 
and Huse (2010) show that there is a positive relationship between female directors and board strategic 
control. Levi, Li, and Zhang (2014) show that firms with female directors decrease the likelihood of 
making acquisitions and such firms pay lower bid premia. Carter, Franco, and Gine (2017) produce 
evidence that greater gender diversity on boards reduces the compensation gap between male and 
female executives. Finally, Chen, Leung, and Goergen (2017) find that firms with a larger proportion 
of female directors on their boards implement higher dividend payouts. These findings suggest that 
female directors play a different monitoring role than their male counterparts in the process of corporate 
decision making. However, despite increasing attention to the effects of gender diversity on corporate 
decision making, debt maturity structure, as one type of important corporate policy, remains 
unexplored. 
Debt maturity structure 
Corporate debt maturity structure serves as an ideal setting to examine the behavioural traits of female 
directors versus their male counterparts, since it is argued that debt maturity structure is not only one of 
the key elements of corporate financial policy, it is also an important corporate governance monitoring 
device. Traditionally, debt maturity structure has been viewed as a mechanism of matching investment 
opportunities (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Myers, 1977), signalling information to the market (Diamond, 
1991b; Flannery, 1986; Rajan, 1992), and influencing tax liabilities (Brick & Ravid, 1985). There is 
also evidence that corporate debt maturity influences choice of leverage and covenants (e.g. Billett, 
King, & Mauer, 2007) and long-term and short-term stock price performance and risk (Dang, Lee, Liu, 
& Zeng, 2018; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2000). 
Considering the governance aspect of debt maturity, since debt with short maturities requires more 
frequent renewal or refinancing, such debt exposes the firm to higher liquidity risk (Diamond, 1991a; 
Myers, 1977). Exposure to high liquidity risk thus induces short-term debt to serve as a corporate 
governance device in controlling for risky overinvestment behaviour (Barnea, Haugen, & Senbet, 1980; 
Smith and Warner, 1979). Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005) further argue that short-term debt can mitigate 
both under- and overinvestment incentives by making the debt less sensitive to changes in firm value 
and by allowing for more frequent repricing of debt. Overall, to the extent that managers are subject to 



























We argue that, given the monitoring capacity of short-term debt, it is likely that female directors may 
employ such debt as a monitoring device to alleviate agency cost. Although the arguments in the 
literature for the monitoring role of short-term debt derive mainly from the belief that it is debtholders’ 
choice of debt maturity or other contractual devices that subjects managers to more frequent or enhanced 
monitoring (Rajan & Winton, 1995; Stulz, 2001), theories on determinants of debt maturity suggest that 
debt maturity structure largely depends on firm discretion (Diamond, 1993; Myers, 1977; Smith, 1986). 
Barclay and Smith (1995) empirically examine several theoretical hypotheses and generate evidence on 
the significant influence of firm discretion on the maturity structure of firm debt. Therefore, controlling 
for the factors that determine debtholder tendency to utilize short-term debt as a monitoring device, we 
aim to understand whether female directors are more likely than their male counterparts to use short-
term debt as a monitoring device. 
Female directors and debt maturity structure 
Female directors bring particular monitoring features to boards. Research from a multidisciplinary 
perspective suggests that gender diversity in the boardroom has significant implications for board 
monitoring. From the perspective of demographic characteristics, female directors increase the 
demographic diversity of the board, leading to board demographic difference compared to 
management.1 Westphal and Zajac (1995) show that powerful CEOs tend to appoint new directors who 
are demographically similar to themselves, thereby securing support from board members. Carter, 
Simkins and Simpson (2003) argue that board diversity increases board independence, because 
directors with a minority gender, ethnicity, or cultural background might bring up questions that would 
not be raised by directors with a more traditional background. Correspondingly, Hillman, Cannella, and 
Harris (2002) find female directors bring a variety of occupational expertise and knowledge, advanced 
education, and closer ties to other organizations. These characteristics may influence the strategic 
choices of the firm. Further, prior research finds female directors tend to exert greater diligence in 
monitoring managers, due to their demographic differences (Tsui, Egan and O’Reilly, 1992; Turner, 
1982). 
Social identity theory suggests that individuals possess a social identity based on their membership in 
distinct social groups or categories, e.g. gender (Turner, 1982). The corporate governance literature also 
suggests that formal and informal social ties between directors and the CEO impede the effective 
monitoring role of directors (Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hwang and Kim, 2009, 2012; Schmidt, 2015). Ray 
(2005) argues that directors on a diverse corporate board are more likely to critically examine each 
others’ viewpoints, consider counterarguments, resolve differences by discussion rather than by 
                                                            
1 There has been a steady increase in executive gender diversity over the past 20 years, but male executives are 
still the majority in top management teams. For example, based on our analysis of data from S&P Capital IQ, only 


























consensus, maintain the firm’s conscience with regard to ethics and social responsibility, and display 
increased sensitivity to opportunities and threats to the firm from the external environment. Stephenson 
(2004) reports that boards with more women are found to surpass all-male boards in their attention to 
audit and risk oversight and control, and are more likely to ensure conflict of interest guidelines and a 
code of conduct for the organization. McInerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria and Salipante (2008) find that 
female directors are associated with better organizational outcomes, and improve and facilitate ‘tough’ 
decision making. These findings suggest that female directors are associated with higher-quality board 
deliberations and discussion of tough issues that could possibly constrain manager behaviour and 
actions. 
In addition, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that female directors have better attendance records than 
male directors and are more likely to join monitoring committees and demand greater accountability 
from managers for poor performance. However, these authors also find that the effect of gender 
diversity on firm performance depends on firm governance quality, i.e. gender diversity has a positive 
impact on performance in firms which have weak governance but a negative impact in firms with strong 
governance. These authors argue that a possible explanation for this is that greater gender diversity 
could lead to over-monitoring in firms with strong governance. Similarly, Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) 
show that the presence of female directors on boards improves the quality of public disclosure and 
informativeness of stock prices through better monitoring, and that this benefit is particularly high in 
firms which lack strong governance. 
Taken together, empirical evidence from the literature suggests that the nature of female directors’ 
deliberation when carrying out their monitoring roles differs from that of males; they also place more 
emphasis on monitoring. In turn, short-term debt has been argued to act as an effective monitoring 
device. On the one hand, such monitoring can reduce the cash flow available for managers to spend at 
their discretion, thereby avoiding the potential for inefficient investments by managers, consequently 
controlling managerial overinvestment behaviour (Barnea, Haugen, & Senbet, 1980; Childs, Mauer, & 
Ott, 2005; Smith & Warner, 1979). On the other hand, short-term debt can enhance managers’ 
incentives to improve the efficiency of fund utilization, by avoiding failure to make frequent short-term 
debt payments (Hart & Moore, 1994; Rajan & Winton, 1995; Stulz, 2001). 
Thus, based on prior empirical evidence that gender-diverse boards are associated with greater 
monitoring, we conjecture that, ceteris paribus, female directors are more likely than male directors to 
use a shorter debt maturity structure to monitor managers. Since the monitoring effects from female 
directors are subject to the quality of the corporate governance of companies whose boards they sit on 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Chen, Leung, & Goergen, 2017; Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011), we further 
hypothesise that the association between female directors and short-term debt is weaker when other 


























3. Data Sources and Sample Selection 
To examine the relationship between female directors and a firm’s debt maturity structure, we use 
several databases to construct our main sample. Specifically, the gender information and corporate 
governance-related information are primarily from RiskMetrics, which provides director profiles for 
S&P 1500 companies. Our sample period ranges from 1997 to 2016. Data on debt maturity and firm 
characteristics are from COMPUSTAT. Following the literature (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Brockman, 
Martin, & Unlu, 2010; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2005), we restrict our analysis to industrial 
firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 2000 to 5999. We delete those 
observations for which debt maturity breached sensible bounds (less than zero percent or greater than 
100 percent). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the 
impact of outliers. Our final sample contains 10,285 observations based on 1,379 unique firms. 
Model specification 
To examine the relationship between the proportion of female directors and a firm’s debt maturity 
structure, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression model: 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)
2
𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝑀𝐵 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑍 −
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽10𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽11𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 
+𝛽14𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽15𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
All variables are explained in the following subsection and defined in Appendix A. We also include 
two-digit SIC industry dummies and year dummies in the model. 
Variable definitions 
Debt Maturity. The literature (e.g. Datta et al., 2005; Johnson, 2003) uses the proportion of debt due 
within three years as a proxy for debt maturity structure, while Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) 
measure debt maturity structure using both the proportion of total debt maturing in three years or less 
and the proportion of total debt maturing in five years or less. There is no particular reason to prefer 
one to the other. Thus, we present our findings using all available measures which can be deemed as 
short-term debt. Specifically, we measure debt maturity structure using five proxies: proportion of debt 
maturing in 12 months or less divided by total debt (ST1); proportion of debt maturing in two years or 
less divided by total debt (ST2); proportion of debt maturing in three years or less divided by total debt 
(ST3); proportion of debt maturing in four years or less divided by total debt (ST4); and proportion of 
debt maturing in five years or less divided by total debt (ST5). This set of measures is also consistent 


























Gender Composition. Our main variable of interest is boardroom gender composition, which is proxied 
by the proportion of female directors on the board. Specifically presented as Fraction of Female Dire 
in our tables, gender composition is measured as the number of female directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. 
Control Variables. Drawing on the literature on debt maturity structures (e.g. Brockman, Martin, & 
Unlu, 2010; Custódio, Ferreira, & Laureano, 2013; Datta et al., 2005; Harford, Klasa, & Maxwell, 2014; 
Johnson, 2003), we control for variables for general and financial firm characteristics, factors identified 
as directly influencing debt maturity structure, and governance features. First, following Johnson (2003) 
and Custódio, Ferreira, and Laureano (2013), we control for both firm size and firm size squared. Firm 
size is correlated with debt maturity for several reasons, including economies of scale and information 
asymmetry. We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of market capitalization. We also include 
size squared as an additional control variable to capture the nonlinear relation between debt maturity 
and firm size as predicted by Diamond (1991b); we predict a negative coefficient. Firms with higher 
growth opportunities tend to use more short-term debt, since short-term debt can alleviate the 
underinvestment problems faced by firms with higher growth opportunities (Billett, King, & Mauer, 
2007). Following Billett, King, and Mauer (2007), we measure growth opportunities using market-to-
book ratio, defined as market value of the firm divided by book value of total assets. Leverage is the 
ratio of total debt to total assets. We predict a negative relationship between firm leverage and short-
term debt, because firms with high leverage are more likely to employ long-term debt to mitigate 
refinancing and default risk. According to Flannery (1986), firms with higher abnormal earnings are 
more likely to issue short-term debt as a signalling device. We thus expect a positive association 
between abnormal earnings and short-term debt. We measure abnormal earnings as changes in income 
before extraordinary items from year t to year t+1 scaled by the market value of equity in year t. 
Following Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003), we include asset maturity in the regressions. We expect a 
positive relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity, since firms tend to match their asset 
maturity with their debt maturity. We also follow Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) to include an 
Altman (1968) Z-score dummy as a proxy for firm credit quality and default risk. The Z-score Dummy 
takes the value of unity if Z-score is greater than 1.81, and zero otherwise.2 We expect a negative 
relationship between short-term debt and the Z-score Dummy, because firms with high credit quality 
are able to issue long-term debt. We also control for whether firms have credit ratings. Since unrated 
firms are more likely to be of lower credit quality than rated firms, unrated firms may be more likely to 
be issued short-term debt by debtholders. We measure Rating Dummy as an indicator variable, taking a 
value of 1 if the firm has an S&P credit rating on long-term debt, and zero otherwise. According to 
                                                            
2 Z-score was developed to predict the probability that a firm will go into bankruptcy. Zones of discrimination 



























Brick and Ravid (1991), when the term structure of interest is upward-sloping, firms should lengthen 
their debt maturity due to the greater tax advantages of long-term debt. Thus, we further control for 
term structure and expect a negative relationship between it and short-term debt. Term Structure is 
measured as the difference between the yield on 10-year government bonds and the yield on 6-month 
government bonds at fiscal year-end. To capture other boardroom characteristics, we include in our 
regressions both board size, measured as natural log of the total number of directors on the board, and 
independence ratio, measured as number of independent directors divided by the total number of 
directors on the board. We also include several CEO-specific characteristics to control for CEO power, 
which may constrain the monitoring roles that directors play. Dual role is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. CEO age and tenure are 
measured as age of the CEO and number of years the CEO has been in the position, respectively. 
Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. For gender composition, the 
mean and median values of our sample firms are 0.121 and 0.096, respectively. Our measurements for 
the dependent variable of short-term debt, ST1, ST2, ST3, ST4, and ST5, have mean values of 
17.6 percent. 26.7 percent, 36.6 percent, 47 percent, and 58.2 percent, respectively. These statistics are 
consistent with the figures reported in the literature (Brockman, Martin, & Unlu, 2010; Dang & Phan, 
2016; Datta et al., 2005). Most control variables in our sample show values similar to those presented 
in Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005), Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010), and Dang and Phan 
(2016). 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
4.  Empirical Results 
Baseline regression results 
Table 2 reports baseline regression results on how board gender composition affects corporate debt 
structure using multiple proxies for short-term debt maturity. In line with our hypothesis, the estimated 
coefficient on Fraction of Female Dire is positive and significant when we use ST1, ST2, or ST3 as 
dependent variables, but insignificant when using ST4 and ST5 as dependent variables. In light of the 
similarity of the results across three proxies for the dependent variable (ST1, ST2, and ST3), we discuss 
the regression results using ST1, i.e. the proportion of debt due within 12 months. 
In Table 2, Column (1), we present the results of estimating Eq. (1) using ST1 as the dependent variable. 
Consistent with our expectations, we find a coefficient on Fraction of Female Dire of 0.109, statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This finding supports our hypothesis that firms with a higher proportion of 


























coefficient in Column (1) indicates that an increase of 10 percentage points in the proportion of female 
directors is associated with a 1.09 percentage point increase in firm short-term debt due within 12 
months. Regarding control variables, consistent with earlier research and current theory (Brockman, 
Martin, & Unlu, 2010; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2005; Huang, Tan, & Faff, 2016), we find that 
ST1 is negatively associated with firm size but positively related to firm size squared. The estimated 
coefficients on leverage, Z-score dummy, rating dummy, and term structure are negative and 
statistically significant, consistent with the literature. The estimated coefficients on market-to-book 
ratio and abnormal earnings are positive and statistically significant, also in line with the literature (e.g. 
Brockman, Martin, & Unlu, 2010; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2005; Huang, Tan, & Faff, 2016). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
An alternative explanation for our results shown in Table 2 relates to female directors’ risk preference 
rather than their monitoring role. Levi, Li, and Zhang (2014) suggest that firms with a higher percentage 
of female directors are less likely to make acquisitions, due to risk aversion. Faccio, Marchica, and 
Mura (2016) find that firms run by female CEOs tend to be more risk averse. To the extent that the 
value of long-term debt varies more widely with unanticipated changes in interest rate than with the 
value of short-term debt, long-term debt is riskier than short-term debt.3 As such, firms with more 
female directors might have a preference for short-term debt also because of a high propensity for risk 
avoidance. If this is the case, we would observe unambiguous effects among female directors regardless 
of their independence and monitoring incentives. However, we may observe differing effects due to a 
difference in their independence, because female inside directors do not exert similar monitoring efforts 
as do independent directors, should the positive association be due to the fact that female directors use 
debt maturity as a monitoring device. 
To gain insight into the mechanisms behind increased short-term debt in the presence of female 
directors, we then break down female directors into two components, female independent directors and 
female inside directors. We posit that female independent directors, by undertaking more monitoring, 
encourage short-term debt more. Results are presented in Table 3. Panel A presents results where the 
test variable is the proportion of female independent directors, while Panel B presents results for the 
proportion of female inside directors. In line with our main regression, Panel A shows that female 
independent directors are more likely to use short-term debt, and the results for ST1 and ST2 remain 
statistically significant, though ST3 becomes statistically insignificant. Similar to the discussion in our 
main regression, we discuss the results with reference only to ST1, for purposes of brevity. In Panel A, 
Column (1), we find that the estimated coefficient of the proportion of female independent directors is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that firms with a greater proportion of 
                                                            
3 In the meantime, the literature discussed in this paper shows mainly that short-term debt exposes firms to high 


























female directors are more likely to use short-maturity debt (ST1), and this relationship is driven by 
female independent directors. In Panel B, Column (1), we find that the estimated coefficient of the 
proportion of female insider directors is statistically insignificant, supporting the notion that the positive 
relationship between the proportion of female directors and short-term debt is due to female directors’ 
monitoring intention rather than their risk preference. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
5. Sensitivity Test 
In the baseline regressions reported in Table 2, we control for several observable firm characteristics 
shown to affect corporate debt maturity structures in the literature. However, we still face a challenge 
in identifying a causal effect of female board representation on corporate debt maturity structures. 
Female directors are not randomly assigned to firms; e.g. managers who are more likely to issue more 
short-term debt may also be more likely to call for greater diversity in the boardroom. We apply both 
IV and PSM approaches (e.g. Chen, Leung, & Goergen, 2017; Huang & Kisgen, 2013) to mitigate 
potential endogeneity issues.4 
PSM results 
In the first stage, we pool firms with female directors and firms without female directors, and predict 
the probability that a firm will appoint a female director. To run a logistic regression, we create a dummy 
variable as the dependent variable, Female, which takes the value 1 for firms with female directors and 
zero for firms without female directors. We predict the probability (i.e. the propensity score) from a 
logistic regression including various firm characteristics, such as firm size, profitability, leverage, credit 
quality, and growth opportunities. We also control for industry and year fixed effects in the logistic 
regression. In Panel A of Table 4, we present logistic regression results on the determinants of female 
directors. In line with prior literature (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Chen, Leung, & Goergen, 2017), we 
find that firms with larger size and larger boards are more likely to have female directors on the board. 
The pseudo R-squared for the logistic regression is high, with a value of 0.330. 
Next, we employ the propensity scores obtained from the logistic regression and perform a one-to-one 
nearest-neighbour match. Specifically, each firm with female directors on the board (i.e. the treatment 
sample) is matched to a firm with all-male directors (i.e. the control sample). To guarantee that the 
treatment sample and the matching sample are sufficiently similar in terms of major firm characteristics, 
                                                            
4 We also employ the difference-in-difference (DID) approach as used in Chen et al. (2017) to further address 
potential endogeneity issues. However, applying DID procedure requires information for three consecutive years 
before year t and at least two consecutive years after year t. Given that our dependent variables including ST5 
have a lot of missing values before applying this criterion, we do not obtain sufficient observations to conduct the 


























we apply the calliper-matching method, and require that the maximum gap between the propensity score 
of each treatment firm and that of its matched control firm does not exceed 0.005 in absolute value.5 
To ensure that there is no significant difference between the treatment sample and the matching sample 
in terms of observable characteristics, we adopt two diagnostic tests. The first consists of re-estimating 
the logistic regression for our post-match sample. The logistic regression results obtained using the 
post-match sample are reported in Column (2) of Panel A of Table 4. None of the estimated coefficients 
is statistically significant in the post-match sample, indicating that no factors that determine short-term 
debt maturity are significantly different after matching. The pseudo R-squared also decreases 
significantly from 0.330 for the pre-match sample to 0.006 for the post-match sample. This finding 
shows that through the PSM approach, we successfully remove the difference arising from all 
observable characteristics other than the difference in the presence of female directors. 
Our second test compares the difference for each observable firm characteristic between the treated and 
control samples. In Panel B of Table 4, we report summary statistics, differences in means, and t-test 
results of the variables used in the matching process for both the treatment sample and the control 
sample. Indeed, none of the differences in means between the treatment sample and the control sample 
is statistically significant. In sum, both of our diagnostic tests indicate that we have successfully 
removed all observable differences other than the difference in the presence of female directors. This 
increases the likelihood that any difference in corporate debt maturity structure is attributable to the 
presence of female directors on boards. 
Panel C of Table 4 presents the difference in the means of short-term debt between the treated and the 
control samples. The results suggest that there are significant differences in short-term debt due within 
12 months, at the 5% level. The results also indicate that there is no significant difference in short-term 
debt maturing in two years, three years, four years, and five years between firms with female directors 
and firms with only male directors. Thus, the findings from applying the PSM mitigate the concern 
regarding self-selection bias and further confirm our hypothesis. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
IV results 
To further account for the endogeneity problem, following Huang and Kisgen (2013), we use an IV 
approach to extract the exogenous component from gender composition in the boardroom, and employ 
it to explain corporate debt maturity structure. We adopt an IV that captures the likelihood of a firm 
hiring female directors, while remaining unrelated to the corporate debt maturity structure, except 
through our control variables. Our IV for a firm having female directors is a state-level gender status 
                                                            



























equality calibrated by Sugarman and Straus (1988). A higher state-level gender status equality value 
suggests more favourable gender equality in a state. This IV is also used by Huang and Kisgen (2013). 
The logic of using this instrument is that the more positive a state is toward women’s equality in general, 
the more likely a firm located in that state is to hire female directors. We assign each firm a state-level 
gender status equality value based on the firm’s headquarters location. Thus, we argue that the higher 
the level of state-level gender status equality, the greater should be the proportion of female board 
directors. 
Table 5 exhibits the two-stage least squares results. Panel A reports the first-stage regression, where the 
proportion of female board directors is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables include the 
IV (state-level gender status equality value) and the same control variables used in the baseline model. 
For brevity, we do not tabulate the coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables, except for our 
main variable of interest. The coefficient on the IV carries a positive coefficient and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the rationale behind the IV (Huang & Kisgen, 2013), the 
state-level gender status equality value significantly explains the gender composition of the board. We 
also report the F-statistic, which is very high for the first-stage regression, indicating that our IV is not 
weak. Moreover, to ensure that our IV is acceptable, we perform Cragg–Donald’s Wald F weak-
instrument test. The p-value of the Cragg–Donald Wald F weak-instrument test statistic is <0.001, 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the instrument is weak (Cragg & Donald, 1993; Stock & Yogo, 2005) 
and suggesting that our IV is valid. 
Panel B of Table 5 shows the second-stage regressions, where the dependent variables are alternative 
proxies for short-term debt, namely ST1, ST2, ST3, ST4, and ST5. We replace the Fraction of Female 
Dire with the predicted value of the proportion of female board directors. The coefficients on the 
predicted values of the proportion of female board directors are positive and statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels when we use ST1, ST2, and ST3 as the dependent variables, respectively, 
echoing the results from our main results in Table 2. Again, our findings on the control variables are 
largely in line with the literature (Brockman, Martin, & Unlu, 2010; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 
2005). This is consistent with our main hypothesis, and indicates that our key result is not unduly 
influenced by endogeneity. 
Overall, after subjecting the results to a battery of tests to account for both self-selection bias and 
endogeneity, our results still hold; i.e. firms with female board directors tend to adopt a short-term debt 
maturity structure. The results from sensitivity tests in this section enhance our argument that the gender 
composition of boards affects corporate debt maturity structure. 


























6. Additional Tests 
Role of corporate governance 
Thus far, we include a limited number of corporate governance characteristics which may influence the 
relationship between board gender composition and corporate debt maturity structure. If firms with 
female directors are more likely to employ short-term debt as a corporate governance device, then we 
conjecture that the positive impact of female directors on short-term debt should be more prominent in 
firms with weak corporate governance and/or high need for corporate governance. We use the 
entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) (E-index) and analyst coverage as proxies 
for governance monitoring mechanisms. 
The E-index is based on six anti-takeover provisions and is formed by calculating the indicator variables 
for each of the six provisions (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, 
golden parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, and charter amendments) for each firm. A 
higher E-index value suggests that a firm is less shareholder-friendly, has greater managerial 
entrenchment, and is more insulated from the external market for corporate control, indicating lower 
corporate governance quality. Analyst coverage is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts 
who issue earnings forecasts for the firm. Higher analyst coverage suggests a lower level of information 
asymmetry between managers and outside investors, indicating stronger external monitoring and better 
governance quality. 
Column (1) and Column (2) of Table 6 present the subsample results for weak governance firms and 
strong governance firms, respectively, based on their E-index median values. The dependent variable 
in these columns is short-term debt due within 12 months. Note that the numbers of observations for 
these subsamples are smaller than those in the baseline model because E-index scores are not available 
for all firms in our sample. The coefficients on the proportion of female directors are positive for both 
subsamples, but significant only for firms with weak corporate governance, where managerial 
entrenchment effects are stronger. In a similar fashion, by splitting the sample by above- and below-
median values of Analyst Coverage, Column (3) and Column (4) of Table 6 estimate high analyst 
coverage and low analyst coverage respectively. The estimated coefficients on the proportion of female 
directors are positive and significant only for the low analyst coverage group (t = 1.883). Overall, our 
findings suggest that corporate governance quality and the need for corporate governance affect the 
impact of female directors on corporate debt maturity structure. The results provide further support to 
our main argument that female directors, by undertaking more monitoring, are more likely to use short-
term debt as a corporate governance device than their male counterparts. 


























Role of financial constraints 
Since we argue that short-term debt may be utilized by female directors as a monitoring device to 
minimize the likelihood of managers overinvesting, we conjecture that the association between the 
proportion of female directors and short-term debt is stronger when firms have fewer financial 
constraints, but weaker when firms are more likely to be subject to financial constraints. Following 
prior studies, we employ three proxies for financial constraints. The first is dividend, measured as an 
indicator variable with a value of 1 if the firm pays a dividend during fiscal year t, and zero otherwise. 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) suggest that financially constrained firms tend to pay lower or 
no dividends to decrease the necessity of raising external funds in the future. Accordingly, we classify 
dividend-paying firm–year observations into the financially unconstrained subsample; in contrast, non-
dividend-paying firm–year observations are classified into the financially constrained subsample. 
Column (1) and Column (2) of Table 7 present the subsample results of estimating Eq. (1) for zero-
dividend and positive-dividend groups. We conjecture that female directors, by undertaking more 
monitoring, will promote more short-term debt in financially unconstrained firms. Consistent with our 
conjecture, we find that the estimated coefficient on the proportion of female directors is positive and 
significant only for financially unconstrained firms (positive dividend–paying firms). 
Our second measure of financial constraint is based on firm bankruptcy risk or financial distress. The 
rationale for using this measure is as follows. When firms face high probability of financial distress, 
they have a high likelihood of facing more severe financial constraints. We employ the Z-score 
developed by Altman (1968) to proxy the probability of firm financial distress, which also influences 
firms’ access to credit, and consequently might limit firm investment. We divide our sample into two 
groups based on Z-score. High-Z is for firm–year observations with Z-score > 2.99 and Low-Z is for 
firm–year observations with Z-score < 1.81.6 Column (3) and Column (4) of Table 7 present the 
subsample results of estimating Eq. (1) for high-Z and low-Z groups. Our third measure of financial 
constraint, following the literature (Carpenter, Fazzari, & Petersen, 1994; Faulkender & Wang, 2006; 
Liu & Mauer, 2011), is firm size. We measure firm size based on a firm’s net assets, i.e. total assets 
minus cash and short-term investments. Given that small firms are generally younger and less well 
known, they are more vulnerable to capital market imperfections and, hence, will be more financially 
constrained. Thus, we assign firm–year observations to the financially constrained (unconstrained) 
group if they have size below (above) the sample median. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 7 present the 
subsample results of estimating Eq. (1) for the large and small groups. 
                                                            
6 As noted in footnote 2, Z-score was developed to predict the probability that a firm will go into bankruptcy. 
Zones of discrimination according to Z-scores: Z > 2.99 – “Safe” Zone; 1.81 < Z < 2.99 – “Gray” Zone; Z < 1.81 


























As predicted, the positive association between female directors and short-term debt is statistically 
significant only for the financially unconstrained observations. In contrast, the coefficient on the 
proportion of female directors is not significant for financially constrained firms, where managers are 
less likely to undertake self-serving overinvestment.7 Taken together, our results are robust across all 
these different measures of financial constraint, suggesting that the positive impact of female directors 
on short-term debt is significant only for financially unconstrained firms, because difficulties in gaining 
access to capital markets prevent managers from undertaking non–value-maximizing investment. 
 [INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Role of leverage 
To rule out the alternative explanation that debtholders are the party that determines corporate debt 
maturity structure, in addition to the variables controlling for debtholder influence, we further examine 
whether the relationship between the proportion of female directors and corporate debt maturity 
structures is affected by firm leverage levels. We use the median value of leverage for our sample to 
classify firm–year observations into high leverage and low leverage, and re-estimate Eq. (1) for the two 
subsamples. Column (1) and Column (2) of Table 8 present the subsample results of estimating Eq. (1) 
for high-leverage and low-leverage observations, respectively. We then conduct seemingly unrelated 
estimations to check the equality of the estimated coefficients between the low-leverage group and the 
high-leverage group. We find no difference between the effects of the proportion of female directors on 
firm debt maturity structures for firms with low leverage levels and firms with high leverage levels, 
suggesting that the impact of the proportion of female directors on debt maturity structures is not 
conditional on the power of debtholders. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
Investment efficiency 
Since we argue that short-term debt serves as a monitoring device used by female directors to reduce 
the risk of management overinvestment, we further directly test the association between female director 
and investment inefficiency. Following Richardson (2006) and Stoughton, Wong, & Yi (2017), we 
derive our measures of investment inefficiency from the following regression model: 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =𝛽0+𝛽1𝑉/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿  + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
                                                            
7 We also follow Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) and Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) to use financial 
crisis as a proxy for financial constraints, and the results are consistent with our conjecture that the positive 
association between female directors and short-term debt is statistically significant only for the financially 


























where 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡  is the measure of new investment level for firm i in fiscal year t, consisting of total 
investment expenditure (𝐼𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡) minus the investment expenditure necessary to maintain assets in 
place (𝐼𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡). V/P is a proxy for growth opportunities. Leverage and Cash are measures of 
financial constraint. Age is the natural log of (1 + the number of years the firm has been covered by 
CRSP). Return is the change in market value of the firm from t-1 to t. Size is the natural log of firm total 
assets at the beginning of year t. To control for the effects of market movement and unobservable firm 
characteristics, we also include year and firm fixed effects in our regression model. 
We define the absolute value of residuals of the above regression model as our overall,  𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 
measure of firm-level investment inefficiency. We further define overinvestment proxy and 
underinvestment proxy as 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = |ε| if ε < 0 and 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = |ε| if ε > 0, respectively. Separation of 
investment inefficiency into overinvestment and underinvestment helps to distinguish the roles female 
independent directors play in mitigating investment inefficiency. Panel A of Table 9 presents the 
regression results of estimating Eq. (2). The negative coefficient on V/P suggests that firms with high 
growth opportunities are associated with higher investment. The positive (negative) coefficient on Cash 
(Leverage) shows that firms with less stringent financial constraints are associated with higher 
investment. Further, the negative coefficient on Size is consistent with the firm life cycle view on firm 
investment. 
We now examine the role of female independent directors with respect to investment inefficiency using 
the following baseline model: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡  =𝛽0+𝛽1𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
where the dependent variable 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 represents our three empirical measures of firm-level investment 
inefficiency, i.e.  𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 ,  𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡, respectively. Our test variable is the proportion of 
female independent directors. Controls in Eq. (3) refer to the following two sets of control variables. 
The first set includes proxies for economic determinants of investment inefficiency adopted by 
Richardson (2006) and Stoughton et al. (2017): MTB, Leverage, Cash, Size, Tangibility, and Age. Our 
second set of controls captures corporate governance characteristics: Board Size and Independence 
Ratio. We also include year and industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) fixed effects. 
Panel B of Table 9 presents the results from estimating Eq. (3). The dependent variables are three 
measures of investment inefficiency: 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡, and  𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡. The estimated coefficients on 
female independent directors are negative and statistically significant across Column (1) and 
Column (2), suggesting that female independent directors are negatively associated with total 
investment inefficiency and overinvestment. Meanwhile, the estimated coefficient on female 
independent directors is statistically insignificant in Column (3), where the dependent variable is 


























 [INSET TABLE 9 HERE] 
7. Conclusion 
Incorporating female directors on boards has been emphasized by regulators, social activists, and the 
media over the past two decades, and companies have responded to the call. However, investigation of 
female directors’ impact remains limited. Adding to the main stream of research which explores female 
directors’ direct effect on firm performance and firm value, we extend the emerging literature on female 
directors’ monitoring role by examining whether gender composition of boards affects corporate debt 
maturity structures. Prior literature suggests that female directors have a different kind of deliberation 
in board discussions and greater monitoring intensity than their male counterparts. Meanwhile, the 
literature on debt maturity structure suggests that short-term debt can serve as a governance monitoring 
device by subjecting managers to greater scrutiny, exposing them to higher liquidity risk and reducing 
cash flow available for overinvestment. Therefore, we hypothesise that boards with more female 
directors are more likely to use short-term debt as a monitoring device, and the effect is weaker when 
other corporate governance mechanisms are strong and overinvestment is less likely to occur. 
Our findings consistently support our hypothesis across several research methods and a variety of 
robustness and additional tests. Specifically, we find that firms with a higher proportion of female 
directors tend to issue more short-term debt than firms with only male directors. This finding is robust 
after considering unobservable heterogeneity, using the PSM and IV approaches. Further analysis 
shows that our full sample results are driven by firms with weak governance quality and higher 
governance needs, suggesting that female directors view short-term debt as a corporate governance 
mechanism in firms with weak corporate governance and higher governance needs. In addition, we find 
that the positive relationship between the proportion of female directors and short-term debt disappears 
when firms have financial constraints, proxied by non-dividend payout, low Z-score, small firm size, 
and during financial crisis, since overinvestment associated with the free cash flow agency problem 
decreases due to the decline in internal cash flow and financial constraints. Finally, a more direct test 
on the association between female independent directors and firm investment inefficiency shows that 
female directors are negatively associated with total investment inefficiency and overinvestment, but 
not with underinvestment, suggesting that our underlying hypothesis  that female directors utilize short-
term debt to minimize the likelihood of overinvestment is more likely to be true. 
Overall, our findings contribute to three streams of literature and have practical implications. First, we 
generate evidence that the presence of female directors is positively associated with use of short-term 
debt, adding to existing research that finds female directors play a significant role in a series of 
important corporate decisions. Second, we contribute to the literature that explores various determinants 
of corporate debt maturity structure and provide evidence that the presence of female directors on boards 


























undertake more monitoring than their male counterparts by using short-term debt as a monitoring 
device, especially when firms have weak corporate governance quality and higher corporate governance 
needs. This contributes to the literature that links gender diversity on boards to monitoring intensity. 
From the perspective of governance practice, our findings suggest that including female directors on 



























Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Variable                                    Definition 
ST1                                               Proportion of debt maturing in 12 months or less divided by total 
                                                      debt. 
ST2                                               Proportion of debt maturing in two years or less divided by total  
                                                      debt. 
ST3                                               Proportion of debt maturing in three years or less divided by total 
                                                      debt. 
ST4                                                Proportion of debt maturing in four years or less divided by total 
                                                       debt. 
ST5                                                Proportion of debt maturing in five years or less divided by total 
                                                       debt. 
Fraction of Female Dire                Number of female directors on the board divided by board size. 
Firm Size                                       Natural logarithm of firm market value. 
(Firm Size)2                                   Square of firm size. 
MB                                                 Market-to-book ratio. Ratio of market value of assets to 
                                                       book value of assets. 
Leverage                                        Sum of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. 
Abnormal Earnings                       Ratio of change between income before extraordinary 
                                                       items adjusted for common or ordinary stock equivalents from 
                                                       year t to t+1 and the market value of equity in year t. 
Asset Maturity                               Ratio of property, plant and equipment to depreciation 
                                                       times the proportion of property, plant and equipment in total 
                                                       assets, plus the ratio of current assets to cost of goods sold 
                                                      times the proportion of current assets in total assets. 
Z-score Dummy                            Equals 1 if Altman’s Z-score is greater than 1.81, and zero 
                                                      otherwise. Following the algorithm in Brockman, Martin, and Unlu 
                                                      (2010), Altman’s Z-score is measured as 3.3*OIADP/AT+ 
                                                      1.2*(ACT-LCT)/AT+SALE/AT+ 0.6*PRCC*CSHO/(DLTT+DLC) 
                                                      +1.4*RE/AT (Data source: COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial file). 
Rating Dummy                              Equals 1 if the firm has an S&P credit rating on long-term debt, and 


























Term Structure                               Difference between yield on 10-year government bonds and yield 
                                                       on 6-month government bonds. 
Board Size                                      Natural log of total number of directors on the board. 
Independent Ratio                          Number of independent directors divided by total number of 
                                                        directors. 
Dual Role                                        Dummy variable that equals 1 if CEO is also chairman of the 
                                                        board, and zero otherwise. 
CEO Age                                         Age of current CEO. 
CEO Tenure                                    Number of years the current CEO has held the position. 
ROA                                                Ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. 
State-level gender status equality   Assignment of state-level gender status equality value to each 
                                                        firm based on where the firm is headquartered. 
E-index                                            An index, used in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), and formed 
                                                         by cumulating the indicator variables for each of six anti-takeover 
                                                         provisions for each firm. 
Size                                                  Natural log of total assets at the start of year. 
Age                                                  Natural log of (1 + number of years the firm has been listed on the 
                                                         CRSP). 
Cash                                                 Cash and short-term investment divided by total assets at the start 
                                                         of year. 
Return                                              Change in market value of the firm. 
INEW                                               Investment measured by the sum of capital expenditure, research 
                                                         and development expenditure, research expenditure, acquisition 
                                                         and sale of property, plant, and equipment (Itotal) minus 
                                                         amortization and depreciation (IMaintenance) divided by total 
                                                         assets at the start of the year. 
V/P                                                   Growth opportunities of the firm proxied by assets in place over 
                                                          firm market value, where assets in place are measured as (1-α 
                                                          γ)BV+α(1 + γ)X- αγd, α = ω/1+γ-ω, γ = 12%, ω = 0.62; BV is 
                                                          book value of assets, d is annual dividend, X is operating income  
                                                           after depreciation (Richardson, 2006). 


























Overall                                             Our empirical measure of overall investment inefficiency, which 
                                                         is the absolute value of residuals derived from regression model 
                                                          Eq. (2). 
Over                                                 Our empirical measure of overinvestment, which is the negative 
                                                         residual derived from regression model Eq. (2). 
Under                                                Our empirical measure of underinvestment, which is the positive 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for our main variables, including observation numbers, mean, 
standard deviation, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile. Our sample contains 10,285 firm–year 
observations during the period 1997 to 2016. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 (1) (2) (3) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
ST1 10,285 0.176 0.245 0.016 0.084 0.216 
ST2 10,285 0.267 0.281 0.056 0.178 0.366 
ST3 10,285 0.366 0.305 0.128 0.291 0.521 
ST4 10,285 0.470 0.316 0.226 0.413 0.710 
ST5 10,285 0.582 0.308 0.349 0.551 0.900 
Fraction of Female Dire 10,285 0.121 0.096 0.000 0.111 0.182 
Fraction of Female Indep Dire     10,285 0.110 0.091 0.000 0.111 0.167 
Fraction of Female Insider Dire 10,285 0.006 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm Size 10,285 8.436 1.556 7.274 8.308 9.495 
(Firm Size)2 10,285 73.590 27.120 52.910 69.030 90.150 
MB 10,285 1.811 0.974 1.194 1.497 2.080 
Leverage 10,285 0.183 0.131 0.082 0.161 0.264 
Abnormal Earnings 10,285 0.005 0.116 -0.013 0.004 0.019 
Asset Maturity 10,285 11.560 10.370 4.027 7.904 15.820 
Z-score Dummy 10,285 0.881 0.324 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Rating Dummy 10,285 0.659 0.474 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Term Structure 10,285 0.017 0.012 0.006 0.018 0.027 
Board Size 10,285 2.243 0.234 2.079 2.303 2.398 
Independent Ratio 10,285 0.737 0.154 0.667 0.778 0.875 
Dual Role 10,285 0.458 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CEO Age 10,285 54.630 11.500 51.000 56.000 60.000 
CEO Tenure 10,285 7.737 6.653 3.000 6.000 10.000 
Analyst Coverage  10,285 1.664 1.143 0.000 1.946 2.639 
E-index 6,127 3.004 1.354 2.000 3.000 4.000 
Dividend 10,285 0.669 0.470 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Inew 9,838 0.059 0.085 0.009 0.036 0.085 
Cash 9,838 0.117 0.146 0.019 0.059 0.156 
Age 9,838 3.253 0.733 2.773 3.367 3.784 
Size 9,838 7.874 1.505 6.727 7.745 8.899 
V/P 9,838 0.570 0.340 0.345 0.506 0.716 
Return 9,838 0.126 0.437 -0.137 0.077 0.301 
Tangibility 9,838 0.322 0.219 0.145 0.265 0.470 
































Table 2. Female directors and debt maturity structures 
This table presents estimation results from pooled cross-sectional regressions of debt maturity on the 
proportion of female directors and control variables. The dependent variable is alternative measures of 
short-term debt, namely, ST1 (short-term debt due within 12 months), ST2 (short-term debt due within 
two years), ST3 (short-term debt due within three years), ST4 (short-term debt due within four years) 
and ST5 (short-term debt due within five years). The sample contains 10,285 firm–year observations 
for the period 1997–2016. All variables are defined in Appendix A. We control for industry and year 
fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
      
Fraction of Female Dire 0.109* 0.115** 0.102* 0.068 0.033 
 (1.911) (2.023) (1.801) (1.212) (0.565) 
Firm Size -0.156*** -0.202*** -0.234*** -0.197*** -0.138*** 
 (-4.554) (-6.010) (-6.975) (-6.026) (-4.176) 
(Firm Size)2 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 
 (4.639) (6.087) (6.912) (5.750) (3.666) 
MB 0.012* 0.007 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (1.810) (1.073) (0.283) (-0.434) (-0.196) 
Leverage -0.444*** -0.507*** -0.498*** -0.420*** -0.283*** 
 (-8.656) (-9.088) (-8.972) (-7.572) (-5.146) 
Abnormal Earnings 0.043** 0.032 0.035 0.024 0.051** 
 (2.409) (1.633) (1.586) (1.137) (2.491) 
Asset Maturity -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (-0.800) (-0.847) (-1.363) (-2.194) (-3.127) 
Z-Score Dummy -0.069*** -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.058*** -0.045*** 
 (-6.316) (-6.400) (-5.882) (-4.336) (-3.249) 
Rating Dummy -0.066*** -0.096*** -0.116*** -0.148*** -0.163*** 
 (-5.422) (-7.220) (-8.208) (-9.745) (-10.160) 
Term Structure -1.401 -2.020** -2.423** -2.929*** -1.480 
 (-1.559) (-2.062) (-2.293) (-2.782) (-1.471) 
Board Size -0.013 -0.005 0.002 0.006 -0.002 
 (-0.619) (-0.220) (0.067) (0.246) (-0.065) 
Independent Ratio -0.040 -0.047 -0.035 -0.028 -0.010 
 (-1.235) (-1.407) (-0.990) (-0.766) (-0.280) 
Dual Role 0.015* 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.006 
 (1.716) (1.080) (0.769) (1.112) (0.618) 
CEO Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.450) (-0.760) (-0.088) (-0.180) (-0.369) 
CEO Tenure 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.021) (1.268) (0.561) (0.060) (0.183) 
Constant 1.120*** 1.442*** 1.684*** 1.648*** 1.514*** 
 (7.024) (9.374) (11.101) (11.239) (10.222) 
Observations 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.173 0.180 0.194 0.225 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 



























Table 3. Board gender composition and debt maturity structures 
This table presents estimation results from pooled cross-sectional regressions of short-term debt on the 
proportion of female independent directors (Panel A) and the proportion of female insider directors 
(Panel B). For each panel, the dependent variable is alternative measures of short-term debt, namely, 
ST1 (short-term debt due within 12 months), ST2 (short-term debt due within two years), ST3 (short-
term debt due within three years), ST4 (short-term debt due within four years), and ST5 (short-term 
debt due within five years). The sample contains 10,285 firm–year observations for the period 1997–
2016. All variables are defined in Appendix A. We control for industry and year fixed effects in all 
specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
      
Fraction of Female Indep Dire 0.115** 0.114* 0.085 0.052 0.024 
 (2.021) (1.948) (1.433) (0.863) (0.381) 
Firm Size -0.156*** -0.202*** -0.234*** -0.197*** -0.138*** 
 (-4.552) (-6.011) (-6.983) (-6.035) (-4.181) 
(Firm Size)2 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 
 (4.632) (6.086) (6.921) (5.762) (3.672) 
MB 0.012* 0.007 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (1.809) (1.070) (0.276) (-0.441) (-0.199) 
Leverage -0.444*** -0.508*** -0.500*** -0.421*** -0.284*** 
 (-8.642) (-9.089) (-8.995) (-7.596) (-5.160) 
Abnormal Earnings 0.043** 0.032 0.035 0.024 0.052** 
 (2.399) (1.627) (1.589) (1.141) (2.493) 
Asset Maturity -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (-0.781) (-0.819) (-1.318) (-2.161) (-3.114) 
Z-Score Dummy -0.069*** -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.058*** -0.045*** 
 (-6.285) (-6.378) (-5.873) (-4.333) (-3.250) 
Rating Dummy -0.065*** -0.096*** -0.115*** -0.147*** -0.163*** 
 (-5.372) (-7.168) (-8.156) (-9.715) (-10.150) 
Term Structure -1.419 -2.040** -2.441** -2.941*** -1.485 
 (-1.579) (-2.081) (-2.308) (-2.791) (-1.476) 
Board Size -0.012 -0.004 0.003 0.008 -0.001 
 (-0.581) (-0.165) (0.145) (0.305) (-0.038) 
Independence Ratio -0.048 -0.055 -0.039 -0.030 -0.011 
 (-1.478) (-1.612) (-1.091) (-0.803) (-0.294) 
Dual Role 0.014* 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.007 
 (1.697) (1.076) (0.796) (1.139) (0.633) 
CEO Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.428) (-0.740) (-0.077) (-0.174) (-0.367) 
CEO Tenure 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.029) (1.264) (0.534) (0.036) (0.170) 
Constant 1.125*** 1.447*** 1.687*** 1.649*** 1.514*** 
 (7.047) (9.391) (11.108) (11.247) (10.224) 
Observations 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 


























Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
      
Fraction of Female Insider Dire -0.041 0.087 0.222 0.184 0.167 
 (-0.294) (0.559) (1.341) (1.083) (0.962) 
Firm Size -0.157*** -0.203*** -0.235*** -0.198*** -0.139*** 
 (-4.571) (-6.051) (-7.039) (-6.073) (-4.203) 
(Firm Size)2 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 
 (4.685) (6.163) (7.008) (5.818) (3.703) 
MB 0.012* 0.007 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (1.782) (1.047) (0.265) (-0.443) (-0.198) 
Leverage -0.449*** -0.512*** -0.502*** -0.422*** -0.284*** 
 (-8.726) (-9.163) (-9.043) (-7.624) (-5.167) 
Abnormal Earnings 0.044** 0.033* 0.036 0.025 0.052** 
 (2.455) (1.686) (1.635) (1.172) (2.514) 
Asset Maturity -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (-0.632) (-0.687) (-1.240) (-2.122) (-3.099) 
Z-Score Dummy -0.069*** -0.081*** -0.078*** -0.059*** -0.045*** 
 (-6.313) (-6.422) (-5.933) (-4.383) (-3.281) 
Rating Dummy -0.064*** -0.095*** -0.115*** -0.147*** -0.163*** 
 (-5.295) (-7.124) (-8.169) (-9.738) (-10.180) 
Term Structure -1.421 -2.036** -2.431** -2.933*** -1.478 
 (-1.582) (-2.077) (-2.297) (-2.784) (-1.470) 
Board Size -0.007 0.001 0.007 0.010 -0.000 
 (-0.342) (0.052) (0.295) (0.389) (-0.006) 
Independence Ratio -0.031 -0.034 -0.019 -0.016 -0.002 
 (-0.960) (-1.012) (-0.541) (-0.448) (-0.065) 
Dual Role 0.016** 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.007 
 (1.975) (1.323) (0.983) (1.252) (0.684) 
CEO Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.464) (-0.785) (-0.121) (-0.204) (-0.387) 
CEO Tenure 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.817) (1.079) (0.416) (-0.032) (0.146) 
Constant 1.116*** 1.436*** 1.677*** 1.643*** 1.510*** 
 (6.975) (9.305) (11.045) (11.194) (10.183) 
Observations 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.159 0.172 0.180 0.194 0.225 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






























Table 4. Propensity score matching estimator 
This table presents propensity score matching estimation results. Panel A reports the results from logit 
regression of the likelihood of the presence of female board members. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable set to 1 if there are female directors on the board in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
Panel A presents the pre-match logit regression on the choice of having female directors and the post-
match diagnostic regression. Panel B presents the univariate comparison between the treatment group 
(firms with female directors) and the control sample (firms with only male directors). Panel C presents 
estimates of the average treatment effects. The dependent variables include alternative measures of 
short-term debt, namely, ST1 (short-term debt due within one year), ST2 (short-term debt due within 
two years), ST3 (short-term debt due within three years), ST4 (short-term debt due within four years) 
and ST5 (short-term debt due within five years). All variables are defined in Appendix A. We control 
for industry and year fixed effects in all specifications. Values of heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics 
are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
  (1) (2) 




Firm Size 0.336*** -0.018 
 
(5.332) (-0.247) 
MB -0.114 0.017 
 
(-1.476) (0.209) 
Leverage -2.115*** 0.169 
 
(-3.744) (0.291) 
Abnormal Earnings 0.545*** 0.148 
 
(2.681) (0.658) 
Asset Maturity 0.030*** 0.000 
 
(2.820) (0.033) 
Z-Score Dummy -0.471** 0.005 
 
(-2.430) (0.026) 
Rating Dummy 0.103 0.031 
 
(0.643) (0.180) 
Term Structure -8.881 6.666 
 
(-1.018) (0.628) 
ROA 0.215 -0.557 
 
(0.235) (-0.610) 
Board Size 4.311*** -0.183 
 
(13.708) (-0.546) 
Independence Ratio 2.975*** -0.086 
 
(6.833) (-0.196) 




























CEO Age -0.002 0.001 
 
(-0.582) (0.222) 
CEO Tenure -0.024*** -0.008 
 
(-2.987) (-0.945) 
Constant -11.377*** 0.650 
 
(-12.236) (0.639) 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.330 0.006 
Observations 10,282 3,598 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Differences in firm characteristics  
                                              Firm–year obs.             Firm–year obs. 
                                              with female dirs.        without female dirs. 
                                              (N = 1799)                        (N = 1799)                       Difference               T-stat 
Firm Size                             7.623                                  7.653                                  0.031                      0.762 
(Firm Size)2                                       59.700                                59.887                                 0.187                     0.294 
MB                                      1.746                                  1.759                                  0.012                      0.378 
Leverage                              0.186                                  0.184                                 -0.002                    -0.356 
Abnormal Earnings             0.008                                 0.004                                  -0.004                     -0.841 
Asset Maturity                     9.379                                 9.429                                   0.050                      0.170 
Z-score Dummy                  0.911                                  0.913                                  0.002                      0.176 
Rating Dummy                   0.497                                   0.495                                 -0.002                    -0.133 
Term Structure                   0.016                                   0.016                                  -0.000                    -0.909 
Board Size                          2.124                                 2.128                                  0.004                      0.626 
Independence Ratio            0.704                                 0.703                                  -0.001                    -0.151 
Dual Role                           0.396                                 0.388                                  -0.008                    -0.478 
CEO Age                            54.450                               54.575                                0.125                      0.318 



























Panel C: PSM estimator 
                                      Firm–year obs.             Firm–year obs. 
                                       with female dirs.        without female dirs. 
                                         (N = 1799)                        (N = 1799)                         Difference               T-stat 
 
ST1                                       0.205                                  0.185                               -0.020**                -2.092 
ST2                                       0.303                                  0.288                               -0.015                    -1.353 
ST3                                       0.413                                  0.398                               -0.015                    -1.306 
ST4                                       0.525                                  0.511                               -0.015                    -1.247 




Table 5. Instrumental variable estimator 
This table presents two-stage least squares regression results from Eq. (1). The instrumental variable is 
the state-level gender status equality value. Panel A reports the results from the first-stage OLS 
regressions with the proportion of female directors as the dependent variable as well as several 
instrument validity tests, including F-statistics for excluded instruments and Cragg–Donald’s Wald 
statistic for weak instrument. Panel B presents the second-stage regression results, where the dependent 
variable is an alternative proxy for short-term debt, namely ST1 (short-term debt due within one year), 
ST2 (short-term debt due within two years), ST3 (short-term debt due within three years), ST4 (short-
term debt due within four years) and ST5 (short-term debt due within five years). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. We control for industry and year fixed effects in all specifications. Values of 
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First-stage regression                Dependent variable: Fraction of female directors 
                 Variable  
State-level gender status equality value                                   0.001*** 
                                                                                                  (3.212) 
Controls                                                                                      Yes 
Industry Dummy                                                                         Yes 
Year Dummy                                                                               Yes 
Observations                                                                          10,188 
F-statistics                                                                              22.710 


























Cragg–Donald Wald F-statistics                                           77.299 












Panel B: Second-stage regression                 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
      
Fraction of Female Dire 2.012*** 1.828** 1.305* 0.972 0.307 
 (2.590) (2.323) (1.683) (1.217) (0.364) 
Firm Size -0.141*** -0.188*** -0.223*** -0.189*** -0.134*** 
 (-3.330) (-4.611) (-5.920) (-5.313) (-3.994) 
(Firm Size)2 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 
 (2.930) (4.175) (5.407) (4.688) (3.322) 
MB 0.016** 0.011 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.019) (1.396) (0.627) (-0.155) (-0.179) 
Leverage -0.340*** -0.413*** -0.430*** -0.368*** -0.266*** 
 (-4.705) (-5.546) (-6.100) (-5.208) (-3.715) 
Abnormal Earnings 0.024 0.015 0.020 0.013 0.047** 
 (1.105) (0.672) (0.815) (0.589) (2.158) 
Asset Maturity -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** 
 (-2.126) (-2.017) (-1.954) (-2.257) (-2.414) 
Z-Score Dummy -0.051*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.042*** 
 (-3.114) (-3.753) (-4.061) (-3.079) (-2.655) 
Rating Dummy -0.096*** -0.124*** -0.137*** -0.164*** -0.170*** 
 (-4.671) (-6.000) (-6.943) (-8.232) (-8.309) 
Term Structure -1.104 -1.676 -2.210** -2.739** -1.368 
 (-1.065) (-1.533) (-1.977) (-2.515) (-1.327) 
Board Size -0.113** -0.095* -0.060 -0.041 -0.015 
 (-2.169) (-1.810) (-1.204) (-0.802) (-0.283) 
Independence Ratio -0.221*** -0.212*** -0.152* -0.117 -0.039 
 (-2.726) (-2.587) (-1.886) (-1.423) (-0.468) 


























 (-0.981) (-1.039) (-0.749) (-0.260) (0.054) 
CEO Age -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.165) (-0.396) (0.121) (0.015) (-0.228) 
CEO Tenure 0.003** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (2.258) (2.127) (1.244) (0.650) (0.154) 
Constant 1.177*** 1.491*** 1.714*** 1.669*** 1.513*** 
 (6.418) (8.481) (10.432) (10.680) (9.954) 
Observations 10,188 10,188 10,188 10,188 10,188 
Adjusted R-squared -0.226 -0.065 0.080 0.142 0.221 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 6. Board gender diversity, debt maturity structures and monitoring 
This table reports subsample analyses of the impact of governance monitoring mechanisms on the 
relationship between short-term debt and the proportion of female directors. The subsample period is 
from 1997 to 2016. We use managerial entrenchment index (E-index) and analyst coverage (number of 
analyst following) to proxy for governance monitoring mechanisms. A low E-index indicates a below-
median level of managerial entrenchment index and a high E-index indicates an above-median level of 
managerial entrenchment index. Low analyst coverage indicates a below-median level of analyst 
following, and a high analyst coverage indicates an above-median level of analyst following. The 
dependent variable is short-term debt, namely ST1 (short-term debt due within one year). All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. We control for industry and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES High-E Low-E High-ANA Low-ANA 
     
Fraction of Female Dire 0.147** 0.065 0.082 0.183* 
 (2.294) (0.569) (1.201) (1.883) 
Firm Size -0.100** -0.170*** -0.063 -0.256*** 
 (-2.010) (-3.594) (-0.877) (-3.599) 
(Firm Size)2 0.005** 0.009*** 0.004 0.014*** 
 (2.004) (3.640) (1.133) (3.399) 
MB 0.012 0.013 0.000 0.035** 
 (1.177) (1.339) (0.033) (2.493) 
Leverage -0.377*** -0.522*** -0.370*** -0.561*** 
 (-6.097) (-5.514) (-5.149) (-7.063) 
Abnormal Earnings 0.010 0.098** 0.031 0.024 
 (0.284) (2.284) (0.860) (0.642) 


























 (-2.046) (0.212) (0.220) (-1.229) 
Z-Score Dummy -0.068*** -0.063*** -0.039** -0.095*** 
 (-4.888) (-2.901) (-2.568) (-5.377) 
Rating Dummy -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.100*** -0.038** 
 (-4.601) (-3.703) (-4.367) (-2.305) 
Term Structure 0.044 -5.927** -2.565* 0.524 
 (0.032) (-2.305) (-1.670) (0.411) 
Board Size 0.002 0.007 0.006 -0.032 
 (0.061) (0.187) (0.176) (-0.876) 
Independence Ratio -0.001 -0.022 0.067 -0.175*** 
 (-0.023) (-0.352) (1.544) (-3.372) 
Dual Role 0.007 0.041*** -0.012 0.036** 
 (0.611) (2.799) (-1.044) (2.384) 
CEO Age 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.622) (-0.294) (0.042) (0.041) 
CEO Tenure -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (-0.850) (0.327) (0.305) (0.689) 
Constant 0.816*** 1.202*** 0.609* 1.592*** 
 (3.641) (5.275) (1.812) (5.365) 
Observations 3,988 2,155 3,758 3,894 
Adjusted R-squared 0.149 0.194 0.160 0.207 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 


























Table 7. Board gender diversity, debt maturity structures and financial constraints 
This table reports subsample analyses of the impact of financial constraints on the relationship between short-term debt and the proportion of female directors. 
The subsample period is from 1997 to 2016. To study the impact of financial constraints on the association between short-term debt and the proportion of female 
directors, we separate firms according to the likelihood that firms suffer from financial constraints. In Columns (1) and (2), we classify firm–year observations 
based on the presence of dividend-paying. In Columns (3) and (4), we divide our sample into two groups based on Z-scores. High-Z is for firm–year observations 
with Z-score > 2.99 and Low-Z is for firm–year observations with Z-score < 1.81. In Columns (5) and (6), we divide our sample into two groups based on firm 
size measured as net assets. ‘Large’ is for firm–year observations with size above the sample median and ‘Small’ is for firm–year observations with size below 
the sample median. The dependent variable is short-term debt, namely ST1 (short-term debt due within one year). All variables are defined in Appendix A. We 
control for industry and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Div Non-div  High-Z Low-Z  Large Small 
         
Fraction of Female Dire 0.158** 0.005  0.135* 0.062  0.121** 0.100 
 (2.177) (0.065)  (1.795) (1.085)  (2.405) (1.133) 
Firm Size -0.161*** -0.120**  -0.163*** -0.086*  -0.178** -0.265*** 
 (-3.856) (-2.080)  (-3.980) (-1.931)  (-2.559) (-2.775) 
(Firm Size)2 0.009*** 0.007**  0.009*** 0.004*  0.010*** 0.015** 
 (3.930) (2.114)  (4.125) (1.700)  (2.685) (2.294) 
MB 0.028*** -0.006  0.003 -0.023  0.013 0.019* 
 (3.291) (-0.600)  (0.414) (-1.553)  (1.520) (1.791) 
Leverage -0.354*** -0.511***  -0.766*** -0.209***  -0.159*** -0.675*** 
 (-5.328) (-7.159)  (-9.168) (-3.530)  (-2.843) (-9.140) 
Abnormal Earnings -0.017 0.087***  0.006 0.087***  0.006 0.069** 
 (-0.721) (3.215)  (0.159) (3.131)  (0.298) (2.364) 
Asset Maturity -0.000 -0.001  -0.001 -0.000  0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.493) (-0.683)  (-0.803) (-0.448)  (0.540) (-1.190) 
Z-Score Dummy -0.058*** -0.083***  - -  -0.020* -0.113*** 
 (-4.716) (-4.190)     (-1.720) (-5.590) 
Rating Dummy -0.049*** -0.112***  -0.073*** -0.009  -0.069*** -0.055*** 


























Term Structure -0.939 -1.866  -1.178 -7.269**  -0.178 -1.808 
 (-0.938) (-1.184)  (-1.147) (-2.308)  (-0.151) (-1.415) 
Board Size 0.016 -0.082**  -0.030 0.029  0.023 -0.032 
 (0.606) (-2.466)  (-1.156) (1.119)  (0.945) (-1.020) 
Independence Ratio -0.093** 0.005  -0.037 0.047  0.027 -0.110** 
 (-2.259) (0.103)  (-0.893) (1.349)  (0.857) (-2.206) 
Dual Role 0.015* 0.024  0.012 -0.001  0.009 0.018 
 (1.654) (1.544)  (1.164) (-0.108)  (1.236) (1.252) 
CEO Age 0.000 -0.001  -0.000 0.000  0.000 -0.000 
 (0.292) (-1.054)  (-0.776) (1.338)  (0.071) (-0.574) 
CEO Tenure 0.001 0.000  0.001 0.001  0.000 0.001 
 (1.124) (0.366)  (1.359) (1.442)  (0.424) (0.907) 
Constant 1.069*** 1.033***  1.200*** 0.535***  1.046*** 1.635*** 
 (5.278) (4.080)  (6.393) (2.692)  (3.071) (4.415) 
Observations 6,885 3,400  7,379 1,226  5,269 5,016 
Adjusted R-squared 0.171 0.178  0.168 0.250  0.137 0.190 
Industry dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 




























Table 8. Board gender diversity, debt maturity structures and financial leverage 
This table reports subsample analyses of the impact of financial leverage on the relationship between 
short-term debt and the proportion of female directors. The subsample period is from 1997 to 2016. To 
study the impact of financial leverage on the association between short-term debt and the proportion of 
female directors, we separate firms according to leverage level. A low-leverage sample includes firm–
years with below-median leverage level. A high-leverage sample includes firm–years with above-
median leverage level. The dependent variable is short-term debt, namely ST1 (short-term debt due 
within one year). We conduct seemingly unrelated estimations to test the equality of estimated 
coefficients between two subsamples (Chi-square and p-value reported). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. We control for industry and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Low-leverage High-leverage 
   
Fraction of Female Dire 0.169*** 0.082*** 
 (3.522) (3.237) 
Firm Size -0.158*** -0.081*** 
 (-6.928) (-5.356) 
(Firm Size)2 0.009*** 0.005*** 
 (7.048) (5.568) 
MB -0.012*** -0.003 
 (-2.699) (-0.490) 
Leverage -1.871*** 0.011 
 (-20.556) (0.388) 
Abnormal Earnings 0.044 0.043*** 
 (0.901) (3.115) 
Asset Maturity 0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.970) (-2.218) 
Z-score Dummy -0.050 0.000 
 (-0.878) (0.011) 
Rating Dummy -0.079*** -0.018*** 
 (-6.961) (-2.869) 
Term Structure -1.721 -2.010** 
 (-1.343) (-2.407) 
Board Size 0.004 0.027** 
 (0.219) (2.416) 
Independence Ratio -0.018 -0.007 
 (-0.588) (-0.413) 
Dual Role 0.011 0.020*** 
 (1.212) (4.012) 
CEO Age -0.001 0.000 
 (-1.488) (0.130) 
CEO Tenure 0.001 0.000 
 (1.118) (0.342) 
Constant 1.274*** 0.451*** 
 (10.643) (6.462) 


































Subsample comparison of 
 coefficients on female director ratio 
 
    Chi-square = 0.79 





























Table 9. Board gender diversity and investment efficiency 
This table presents the regression results of firm inefficient investments on the ratio of female 
independent directors.  
Panel A of this table reports regression results of optimal investment expenditure. The determinants of 
investment include proxies for growth opportunities, leverage, firm age, size, cash, and firm and year 
fixed effects. We use the absolute value of residuals as the proxy for investment inefficiency. The 
sample period is from 1998 to 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel B reports regression results of investment inefficiency on the ratio of female independent 
directors, i.e. Eq. (3). The dependent variables are the investment inefficiency proxy variables: Overall, 
Over and Under, derived from Eq. (2). The sample period is from 1998 to 2016. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. We control for industry and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 





















Adjusted R-squared 11.54 
Firm dummy Yes 


































Panel B  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Overall Over Under 
    
Fraction of Female Indep Dire -0.015* -0.022* -0.008 
 (-1.874) (-1.735) (-1.226) 
MB 0.002** 0.004** 0.001 
 (2.282) (2.252) (1.080) 
Leverage 0.005 0.001 0.007** 
 (1.324) (0.109) (2.048) 
Cash 0.040*** 0.056*** 0.032*** 
 (5.060) (3.858) (5.304) 
Tangibility -0.009* -0.013* -0.008 
 (-1.731) (-1.951) (-1.575) 
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.002*** 
 (-1.300) (0.586) (-2.607) 
Size -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (-5.472) (-4.605) (-4.774) 
Board Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.263) (-0.110) (-0.706) 
Independence Ratio 0.004 0.006 0.003 
 (0.738) (0.703) (0.653) 
Dual Role -0.002 -0.002 -0.002* 
 (-1.324) (-0.749) (-1.662) 
CEO Age -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* 
 (-2.029) (-1.446) (-1.855) 
CEO Tenure -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.222) (-0.337) (-0.074) 
Constant 0.090*** 0.104*** 0.082*** 
 (8.219) (6.361) (8.031) 
    
Observations 9,641 4,073 5,568 
Adjusted R-squared 0.072 0.078 0.094 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
 
